IndexAbstractMission Command: Operation AnacondaBuild cohesive teams through mutual trustCreate shared understandingProvide clear commander intentExercise disciplined initiativeUse mission ordersAccept prudent riskConclusionWorks CitedSummaryThis persuasive essay conducts a mission command analysis during Operation Anaconda,” a military operation conducted in the Shahikot Valley during the very early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. This operation followed the Battle of Tora Bora which led to the partial defeat and escape of Taliban and al Qaeda forces across the Pakistani border due to a lack of coalition blocking forces. Operation Anaconda shows how mission command principles are interconnected and directly linked to battlefield operations. Also depicted during Operation Anaconda was the fractured nature of mission command principles when their acceptance and execution are not fully implemented. The successes and subsequent failures of this operation and its associated mission command principles set the stage for all future engagements in the war in Afghanistan. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay Mission Command: Operation Anaconda The Department of the Army's Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 defines mission command as "the Army's approach to command" and control that allows for a process subordinate decision-making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation”. Mission Command in the United States Army is based on six principles: building cohesive teams through mutual trust, creating shared understanding, providing clear commander intent, exercising disciplined initiative, utilizing mission orders, and accepting risk prudent, which allow commanders and their staffs to initiate military battle plans with clear guidance and directive. Commanders and their staffs employ mission command to maneuver forces and shape operations according to "commander's intent" driven by mission, enemy, terrain, available troops, and civilian considerations (MET-TC). Military operations are employed through mission command philosophy, executed by combatant troops, and enabled across military lines of effort. The failure of all six mission command principles during Operation Anaconda forever altered how the United States conducts warfare, while creating enormous challenges that our forces are still grappling with. Building Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust The United States began the war with select coalition forces and local militias from the Lion of Panjshir, Ahmad Shah Masoud's Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance consisted of battle-hardened Turkmen, Uzbek and Afghan militias who honed their fighting prowess during 20 years of war against the Soviet Union. However, during Operation Anaconda, local militia troops were not associated with the Northern Alliance, but rather with Zia Lodin's “Eastern Alliance”. To build a cohesive team, U.S. forces rushed to develop mutual trust, thus ignoring cultural norms. Ultimately, Lodin's forces unexpectedly retreated, leaving the American infantry troops alone and vulnerable on the eastern slopes of the Shahikot Valley. Expanding mutual trust would build a more cohesive team between the U.S. Army and the militiaPashtun. This fully developed scenario would have provided more “buy-in” regarding the essential role of the Pashtuns' vital mission as the “hammer” in Operation Hammer and Anvil. Creating Shared Understanding The end state of shared understanding is for all stakeholders to maintain a shared understanding of the battlespace and its operational environment, including its problems, alternative courses of action, and solutions inherent to the way forward. A deeply shared understanding during Operation Anaconda was between the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and U.S. Army Lieutenant General (LTG) Paul Mikolashek, a member of the Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) of the U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael Moseley and U.S. Army Afghanistan Tactical Commander Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck. The CFLCC and CFACC and their attached commands were stationed in the Persian Gulf while MG Hagnebeck and its units were ashore in Afghanistan. The shared idea of ​​the operation was understood by all US commanders, although its fruits were not borne during the battle, mainly due to the fragmented command structure. Provide clear commander intent “Operation Anaconda sought to eliminate the enemy in that valley area and in those hills,” said Gen. (GEN) Tommy R. Franks, U.S. Army commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). This intent was clearly conveyed by GEN Franks to tactical and component commanders wherever they were stationed. Although this divided command structure was made up of assorted units, everyone had a role in the operation's ultimate success or failure. For example, ground operations commanders could not approve airstrikes or direct certain special operations units and non-military entities such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Although GEN Franks was able to provide clear intentions to commanders, the broken command structure inhibited commanders' decision making. Disciplined Exercise Initiative "Disciplined Exercise Initiative" is "action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unanticipated opportunities or threats arise" according to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 US troops exercised disciplined initiative by being versatile, agile and flexible. They also displayed great disciplined initiative as their original battle plans were discarded and replaced by different fire and maneuver patterns as US forces committed to the role. of both “hammer and anvil.” Thanks to these changes, American forces were able to overcome unexpected obstacles and emerge relatively victorious. Use mission orders Mission orders guide the use and deployment of equipment, resources, tasks, missions and personnel. During Operation Anaconda, indirect fire weapons, combat helicopters and armored fire support platforms such as infantry fighting vehicles or cavalry fighting vehicles for infantry support were not sufficiently allocated to the operation. These shortcomings were based on imperfect information and a lack of properly coordinated air assets. Commanders quickly realized the dire circumstances of their situation and began initiating contingencies and alternative courses of action (AOC), such as immediately replacing damaged Apache combat helicopters and relying on hidden fuel, ammunition, and other supplies that maximized the allocation of resources. Only after the mission orders were the fortunes adjusted 2002..