Johnson and the Vietnam War He was determined not to be held responsible for allowing Vietnam to fall into the hands of the Communists. Johnson believed that the key to success in the war in South Vietnam was to scare the leaders of North Vietnam with the possibility of full-scale U.S. military intervention. In January 1964 it approved covert, covert attacks against North Vietnamese territory, including commando raids against bridges, railroads, and coastal installations. Johnson also ordered the U.S. Navy to conduct surveillance missions along the coast of North Vietnam. He increased covert bombing of Laos territory along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a growing network used to transport supplies to South Vietnam. On August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese coastal gunboats fired on the destroyer USS Maddox, which had infiltrated the territorial borders of North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin. Johnson ordered more ships to the area, and on August 4, Maddox and USS Turner Joy reported that North Vietnamese patrol boats had opened fire on them. Johnson then ordered the first air strikes against North Vietnamese territory and went on television to seek approval from the American public. The U.S. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which handed the war power to Johnson until “peace and security” could be restored to Vietnam. The CIA was forced to admit that the NLF's strength continued to grow. Johnson began to steadily intensify US bombing of North Vietnam, which began sending well-trained units of his People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) into the South. NLF guerrillas coordinated their attacks with PAVN forces. Between February 7 and 10, 1965, the NLF launched surprise attacks on U.S. forces… middle of paper… from the area. In 1967 the ground war reached a stalemate, which led Johnson and McNamara to increase the ferocity of the air war. By 1966, the bombing of North Vietnam's oil facilities had destroyed 70 percent of its fuel reserves, but the DRV's ability to wage war had not been compromised. Planners wanted to avoid populated areas, but when U.S. warplanes were flying 150,000 sorties a year, civilian casualties were inevitable. These losses caused revulsion both in the United States and internationally. In 1967 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, declared that there were no more "major military targets" remaining. Unable to extend the bombing to population centers, the American Department of Defense had to admit the stalemate in the air war too. The damage already inflicted on the people of Vietnam was enormous.