John Greco in, The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge, argues that “…knowledge is true belief grounded in intellectual ability” (Greek 1). Now, this is categorically a “virtue-reliability” claim or, more specifically, an “agent-reliability” claim. The purpose of this article is to analyze the reliability of Greco's virtue. Furthermore, articulate a strong objection to Greco's view and argue that Greco's defense of the reliability of virtue fails. Specifically, it will be argued that the new example of the 'Sea Race Objection' actually refutes Greco's version of the reliability of virtue. Greco's Virtue Reliabiliism-Greco holds that, "...knowledge is true belief founded on intellectual virtue" (Greco 1). Greco then applies intellectual virtues to abilities, arguing that “we think of” intellectual virtues as abilities of the agent who “knows.” Greco then argues that intellectual virtues derive from success resulting from abilities, stating that success is the merit of the agent. This means that the agent who has the ability is therefore credit worthy. Greco argues that, “[thus], attributions of knowledge can be understood as attributions of credit: when we say that someone knows something we give them credit for having understood correctly. When we deny that someone knows something, we deny them credit for doing things well” (Greek 1-2). In short, the agent's success is therefore noteworthy, while the agent's failure is not. Furthermore, it should be noted that the agent's success must arise from his ability. The agent's luck is therefore not noteworthy, the success must arise directly from the agents' skill, even if the agent's luck led them to the truth. Greco clearly argues that knowledge is incompatible with luck (Greco 2). Greek......middle of paper......be lucky. Muriel winning the race clearly shows how luck and knowledge are compatible. Instead of Greco's claim that "we" should credit those with knowledge for getting something right, the example of the Sea Race Objection shows that luck is creditable and intrinsically tied to other knowledge , however the connection may be vague or “tightly tied”. If this argument holds, then the backbone of Greco's claim about the reliability of virtue collapses. A further application of the Sea Race objection would be that luck is virtuous, but this article does not make that claim. One objection to the Sea Race Objection example that fits Greco's framework is that knowledge is an outcome, while luck is not. However, if Muriel wins the race through luck, it is an achievement achieved by the lucky ones. In short, knowledge is compatible with luck. This point will be explored further in future works.